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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between misinformation about product
quality and quality standards, such as minimum quality standards and certification
criteria, when products are vertically differentiated in their health/safety aspects.
We investigate the welfare effect of regulating misinformation and strengthening
MQSs. We find that when the amount of misinformation on both low- and high-
quality products is small, regulating misinformation on low-quality products reduces
welfare, although the strictness of an MQS influences its effect. On the other hand,
regulating misinformation on high-quality products always improves welfare. We
also find that a stricter MQS can harm welfare. This, in particular, is likely to occur
when the difference between the perceived quality of the two types of products is
large and when firms generate high degrees of misperceptions. Moreover, we extend
the analysis by endogenizing quality investments and demonstrate that regulating
misinformation on high-quality products may deteriorate their true quality and,
thus, reduce welfare.
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1 Introduction
In the past few decades, consumers—particularly in developed countries—have become
more conscious of the health and safety aspects of the products they consume. For
example, when purchasing food products, consumers want to know when, where, and
how these products were produced. Being faced with the fact that the increasing number
of persons suffers from diabetes and other chronic diseases, they also demand information
on whether a product is healthy, such as the percentage of fat and number of calories
in their food. Similarly, when parents purchase toys for their children, they may seek
information not only on the safety of the toys but also on whether toxic substances were
used in production processes.1 However, since consumers often respond fervently and
rapidly to information on safety and health issues and place too much confidence in it,
this trend may result in extreme reactions.2 Occasionally, they even purchase goods based
on information that is not well-grounded.
There are two clear strands of responses by producers, such as food companies, toy
companies, and farms to this growing trend in consumer behavior. Governments have
reacted to both types of firm response.
First, since consumers are heterogeneous on the weight they place on these issues
relative to other quality and price factors, firms vertically differentiate their own products
from those of rivals. For example, some producers offer food free of genetically modified
organisms and without irradiation, while normal low-priced food survives the competition
with these high-quality products.3
Consequently, governments have taken action to regulate product quality. They have
1See Grunert (2005) for more details on consumer behavior. In addition, many studies have evaluated
consumers’ willingness to pay for higher-quality products according to safety and health factors (see
Caswell and Joseph, 2007 for a survey of this literature). Although the magnitude of the willingness
to pay varies across these studies, they show that consumers are prepared to pay a premium for health
and safety factors. There is also literature that investigates the effect of safety information on demand
by using objective data such as prices, news, and regulations (Chang and Kinnucan, 1991, Piggot and
Marsh, 2004).
2For example, it can often be observed in Japan that if a television program recommends a certain
food as nourishing and healthy, sales of that particular food product soars.
3See Caswell and Joseph (2007) on this point.
2
set two types of quality standards: minimum quality standards (MQSs), which are the
standards for lower-quality products, and certification criteria, which are the standards for
higher-quality products. In the U.S., the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) oversees
food safety and sets strict standards to regulate various kinds of products, ingredients,
and additives.4 In Japan, the Food Sanitation Act, originally enacted in 1947, regulates
food safety, thereby protecting consumers’ health, as well as the use of additives and
chemicals in toys and containers. This law has been amended many times and the stan-
dards have become increasingly strict over the years.5 Since all firms have to comply with
these regulations, they can be considered as MQSs. In other words, governments assure
consumers minimum health/safety levels in daily life.
They also set certification criteria for relatively high-quality products. In developed
countries, organic food is usually certified by third parties and distributed with labels
conveying that information to consumers. In certain cases, countries have labeling rules
for pesticide-free agricultural produce, while in others, private companies and third parties
have instituted voluntary labeling systems.6
Second, firms conduct misleading advertising, which is referred to as “misinformation”
in the field of Industrial Organization, causing consumers to misperceive the products’
quality.7 In particular, such misinformation can lead consumers to believe that a product
is of a higher quality than it actually is. Moreover, because the image associated with a
product can influence consumer perception, print advertising and television commercials
4See the FDA website (http://www.fda.gov/).
5For example, in 2003, the upper limit on the percentage content of lead in cooking utensils was
lowered from 10 percent to 0.1 percent. In addition, the standards on the content of cadmium and other
chemicals in toys were revised. See the website of the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
for information on food safety (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/foodsafety/index.html).
6In the case of toys, consumers in Japan can buy toys marked “ST” (“Safety Toy”), which means that
they comply with a body of standards including those regulated under the Food Sanitation Act. Some
foreign standards, such as part of the standards for “CE” (Conformite´ Europe´enne) certification, are also
included in the inspection that authorizes the ST mark. A toy affixed with the CE mark complies with
EU standards, some of which are stricter than those set by the Japanese government. About 70% of toys
distributed in Japan carry the ST mark. Consumers believe that toys with the ST label are safer than
those without; they may also observe the CE mark on certain toys sold in Japan and may know that EU
standards are stricter than Japanese standards.
7Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) and Hattori and Higashida (2011) provide several detailed examples.
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often convey only positive information. For example, many kinds of diet food available are
often marketed with sales messages that read “our product is nutritious” or “low calorie,
low fat, and good for your health.” Certain food may be advertised in the media with the
sales message of “no chemical pesticides,” possibly making consumers to misperceive the
message to mean “organic.” In addition, a commercial for a fast food chain may advise
consumers that “your health depends on eating breakfast at our hamburger restaurant”;
therefore, certain consumers perceive that eating hamburgers for breakfast may be healthy
without contemplating the negative aspects of fast food.8 These simple informational
messages can create misperceptions among consumers who are concerned about eating
healthy.9
In response to this widespread misinformation, many governments began to regulate
advertising. The EU adopted the “Television without Frontiers” Directive in 1989, which
contains provisions that regulate advertising to protect consumers’ health and safety.
Moreover, Directive 2006/114/EC regulates misleading and comparative advertising to
control misinformation in the interest of consumers, competitors, and the general pub-
lic.10 In the U.S., the Federal Trade Commission is in charge of regulating misleading
advertising. It has a special division within the Bureau of Consumer Protection—the
Division of Advertising Practices—that sets advertising guidelines for several kinds of
products, including dietary supplements.11 In Japan, in addition to the Japan Fair Trade
Commission, the government has established the Consumer Affairs Agency in 2009, which
monitors misleading advertising on health, safety, and nutritional aspects of food prod-
ucts.12 Nevertheless, misleading advertising still often appears on television, in newspa-
pers, and other media, because of the difficulty faced in judging whether an advertisement
8Garde (2008) discusses the relationship between food advertising and obesity, particularly in relation
to overweight children.
9See Byrd-Bredbenner and Grasso (2001) on this point.
10See the website of this directive for details
(http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/audiovisual and media/index en.htm).
11See the Division of Advertising Practices website (http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/bcpap.shtm).
12See the Consumer Affairs Agency website (http://www.caa.go.jp/en/index.html).
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violates the prescribed regulations.13
This paper focuses on the relationship between misinformation/misperceptions and
MQSs when products are vertically differentiated in their health/safety aspects. Our
model features a low-quality product and a high-quality product. This focus is important
because misinformation and MQSs are closely related to each other in terms of theory and
reality. We have two main purposes: to investigate the welfare effect of regulating mis-
information in the presence of quality standards (an MQS and a certification criterion),
and examine the welfare effect of a stricter MQS in the presence of misinformation. We
consider MQSs to be more important than certification criteria in terms of health/safety
issues, because MQSs guarantee minimum quality/safety and all firms that supply prod-
ucts to the market must abide by them. Therefore, we focus not on a certification criterion
but on an MQS.
In the field of industrial organization, advertising is classified as either informative
or persuasive. Informative advertising provides consumers with useful information that
enables them to recognize more precisely the true quality or attribute of a product. Per-
suasive advertising, in contrast, appeals to consumers by sending only information on a
product’s positive attributes, which is likely to cause consumers to perceive that a prod-
uct is of a better quality than it truly is. The latter type of advertising can therefore
be harmful to consumers and welfare. The advertising we deal with in this study comes
under persuasive advertising.14
Significant literature exists on the economic analysis of advertising (Nelson 1974, Dixit
and Norman 1978, Becker and Murphy 1993, Glaeser and Ujhelyi 2010).15 Our research
is related to Dixit and Norman (1978) in terms of the demand-expansion effect of ad-
vertising. They utilize both pre- and post-advertising demands in evaluating welfare,
13Byrd-Bredbenner and Grasso (2001) investigated the effects of a food advertising policy on televised
nutrient content claims and health claims of the the Federal Trade Commission, which became operational
in 1994. Hansen and Law (2008) analyzed the effect of truth-in-advertising regulations in the early
twentieth century.
14Strictly speaking, there is one more kind of advertising, known as “complementary advertising.” See
Bagwell (2007).
15Bagwell (2007) provides a survey on the economics of advertising.
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and demonstrate that the market equilibrium level of advertising is excessive under a
monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition. Our research is also closely related
to Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) in terms of their focus on the welfare effect of regulations on
misinformation. In particular, they investigate several kinds of policies and derive condi-
tions under which policies can increase welfare; however, both studies assume symmetric
firms.
In contrast, we consider the situation in which products of two firms are vertically
differentiated in terms of health/safety-related quality. In addition to regulations on mis-
information, we examine the welfare effect of a stricter MQS (a quality standard), which
has not yet been dealt with in previous studies. Consumers are usually heterogeneous
in their evaluation of health/safety attributes and, accordingly, firms have incentives to
vertically differentiate their products. Moreover, as noted above, in practice there are
usually MQSs for lower-quality products and labeling schemes for higher-quality prod-
ucts. Thus, the relationship between misleading advertising and regulations/standards
needs to be disentangled in the presence of vertical differentiation.
There is also a large amount of literature on markets with vertically differentiated
products.16 For example, Schmalensee (1978) assumed quality differences and examined
equilibria in terms of profits, advertising, and market shares of firms, but he did not
investigate welfare effects. Moreover, a considerable number of studies have examined the
effects of environmental policies, including MQSs and eco-certifications, in the presence of
vertical differentiation (Motta and Thisse, 1999, Moraga-Gonza´lez and Pandro´n-Fumero,
2002, Hamilton and Zilberman, 2006, Toshimitsu, 2008). Our model is closely related
to that of Moraga-Gonza´lez and Padro´n-Fumero (2002) in terms of the framework, in
particular, the shape of the utility function. In contrast to their study, we focus on the
situation in which misinformation exists, and accordingly, perceived utility is different
from true utility.
16Ecchia et al. (2003) surveyed the regulation of vertically differentiated markets through MQSs, and
Bacchiega et al. (2010) obtained important results on MQSs and market coverage.
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The model has two features to support the achievement of our goals. First, we consider
the case where firms compete in price. In terms of theoretical clarity and simplicity,
we choose the Bertrand competition, although the case of Cournot competition can be
analyzed in a similar way.17 Second, we consider in the main analysis that true qualities
are bound by quality standards, which implies that we exclude decision making on quality
investments. It is generally costly for a firm to invest in quality. Therefore, if a quality
standard is strict, it is likely that a firm does not have an incentive to improve the quality
of its own product by any more than that required by the standard. In addition, it can
be applied to the situation in which quality investments are long-term decisions, because
it takes longer for firms to decide the level of investment than to choose a certain amount
of misleading advertising. Therefore, except where firms are forced to change the true
quality of their products because of changes in quality standards, they do not introduce
these quality changes in the short run. However, a change in the quality of a high-quality
product in response to a change in the MQS may have an important welfare effect in
the long run. Therefore, as an extension we consider the case in which the quality of a
high-quality product can vary.
We find that when the amount of misinformation on both low- and high-quality prod-
ucts is large, a small decrease in misinformation on a low-quality product improves welfare,
although the strictness of an MQS influences its effect. On the other hand, a small de-
crease in the misinformation on the high-quality product always improves welfare. We also
demonstrate that a more stringent MQS can harm welfare, which in particular is likely to
occur when the difference between the perceived qualities of the two types of goods is large
and when firms generate high degrees of misperceptions. Results of the MQS cannot be
observed when there is no misperception among consumers. Thus, it becomes clear that
misinformation plays an important role in the effect of a change in an MQS. Moreover,
we extend the analysis by endogenizing the quality investment of a high-quality firm and
demonstrate that regulating misinformation on high-quality products may deteriorate its
17The results do not change essentially.
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true quality, and therefore, reduce welfare.
For clarity, we choose not to deal with the following two factors. First, we do not
consider the issue of the quality and credibility of advertising, which has been tackled
in several articles.18 In contrast, following Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010), we assume that
misinformation can cause consumers to misperceive a product’s quality as intended by
a firm. In other words, consumers are “naive” in the sense that they always believe
misinformation.19 Then, we introduce the cost function that relates the cost of advertising
to the degree of “misperception.”
Second, we do not delve into the credibility of the certification schemes that are stan-
dards for high-quality products. In reality, sometimes many kinds of labeling exist in
one product category, which can confuse consumers and/or cause them not to believe the
product labeling or third parties that award these labelings.20 Although this is also an
important issue in vertically differentiated markets, we assume in this paper that the certi-
fication scheme for high-quality products is credible because our focus is on the distortion
caused by misinformation and the effect of changes in the MQS.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the model and exam-
ine the effect of changes in the amount of misinformation on firm revenue and consumer
surplus, respectively. Section 4 investigates the amount of misinformation in equilibrium
and the effect of government intervention, such as sending counter-information and edu-
cating consumers. Section 5 investigates the effects of stricter MQSs on the amount of
misinformation and, accordingly, on welfare. Section 6 extends the analysis to the case
18For example, Mullainathan et al. (2008) investigated how senders of advertising can persuade re-
ceivers using the concepts of transference and framing. Anderson and Renault (2006) discriminated be-
tween price and quality information. Moreover, Kihlstrom and Riorden (1984) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) examined the role of information sent by advertising as a signal.
19Although misleading advertising can benefit a firm in the short run, it may cause a loss in the long
run by damaging the firm’s reputation. The assumption of naive consumers excludes the reputational
effects of misleading advertising. In addition, we do not focus on branded products but on goods that
relatively have a short life, such as diet foods. In the market for these products, new products enter the
market quite often. Therefore, consumers are likely to be misled on repeated occasions. Our analysis
also fits for situations in which it takes a long time for consumers to realize “misperception”.
20Mahenc (2009) examined this type of credibility problem and demonstrated that labeling may be
wasteful if the third party is untrustworthy.
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in which a firm producing a high-quality product chooses the amount of investment in
improving the product’s true quality. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
2.1 Demand
There exists a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who differ in their marginal valu-
ations, θ, of unhealthy/unsafe attribute of a product. To simplify, we assume that the
valuation corresponding to a consumer is uniformly distributed in the market, θ ∈ [0, 1].
We also assume that the market is partially covered, i.e., certain consumers are seriously
concerned about the negative effects of the unhealthy/unsafe attribute of products and
buy nothing.
Two types of products are supplied to the market: a low-quality (Type l) good, which
is less healthy or safe, and a high-quality (Type h) good. Each consumer purchases either
one or no units of the product. The perceived net surplus of consumer θ is as follows:21
uˆ = v − θ(sk − ek)− pk, k = l, h, (1)
where subscripts l and h denote types l and h, respectively. v and pk denote the utility
obtained from consuming a single unit of the product irrespective of the unhealthy/unsafe
attribute and the price of the product of Type k (k = l, h), respectively. In addition, sk
and ek denote the true quality and degree of misperception for each type of product,
respectively. Defining that sˆk = sk − ek (k = l, h), we consider “naive” consumers, i.e.,
they are able to observe only sˆk.
Since firms create misperceptions by sending misinformation to consumers, it can be
assumed that the degree of misperception is equivalent to the amount of misinformation.
Thus, ek also represents the amount of misinformation sent by each firm. A greater sk
21When “positive” attributes of vertically differentiated products are focused on, the utility is usually
defined as uˆ = θ(sk−ek)−pk. Even if we assume this type of utility, similar results are obtained. However,
we consider situations in which consumers who are very concerned about the attribute/quality do not
buy the product. Thus, the utility defined in (1) fits real situations related to health/safety issues. The
utility function as observed in (1) can be seen in the field of Environmental Economics (Moraga-Gonza´lez,
Jose´ Luis and Noemi Padro´n-Fumero (2002)).
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implies a less healthy/safe product. Thus, from the definition of types, sl > sh holds. We
assume that the order of perceived qualities is not reversed by misinformation sent by
each firm, i.e., sˆl > sˆh holds. We also assume that there is no externality on advertising,
i.e., misinformation of one type of product does not directly affect the perceived quality
of another type of product.22
We derive the demand functions for these differentiated products. The index of the
marginal consumer who is indifferent between the net surpluses given by purchasing the
low- and the high-quality products is characterized by θ˜ = (ph − pl)/(sˆl − sˆh). The index
of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between the net surpluses given by purchasing
the high-quality product and nothing is θˆ = (v − ph)/sˆh.
Let ql (resp. qh) represent the quantity demanded of the low-quality (resp. high-quality)
product. Assuming a uniform distribution, the demand functions are denoted as follows:
ql = θ˜ =
ph − pl
sˆl − sˆh , qh = θˆ − θ˜ =
sˆl(v − ph)− sˆh(v − pl)
sˆh(sˆl − sˆh) .
Given perceived qualities (sˆk), the demand for each type of product decreases (resp.
increases) in its own price (resp. in the price of the other type of product). Given the
prices of both products, the demand for each type of product increases (resp. decreases) as
its perceived quality (resp. the perceived quality of the other type of product) increases,
i.e., ∂qk/∂sˆk < 0 and ∂qk/∂sˆi > 0, where i, k = l, h, i 6= k.
2.2 Firms
Firm k (k = l, h) supplies Type k good. Each firm sends misinformation to consumers,
which is costly. The cost function is defined as follows:
fk(ek) = αke

k, αk > 0, k = l, h. (2)
We assume that f ′k > 0 (resp. f
′
k < 0) when ek > 0 (resp. ek < 0) and f
′′
k > 0. Note that
fk(0) = 0 and f
′
k(0) = 0. For simplicity, it is assumed that costs depend on neither the
22This externality is important when we consider the case in which products are horizontally differen-
tiated. See Hattori and Higashida (2011).
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production amounts nor true qualities.23 It is also costly to increase the true quality (to
decrease sk), and the cost function is defined as Fk(sk) (F
′
k < 0, F
′′
k > 0, k = l, h). This
cost is also assumed to depend on neither the production amount nor misinformation.
Thus, profit functions are given as follows:
pik = pkqk − fk(ek)− Fk(sk), k = l, h. (3)
Each firm’s objective is to maximize its own profit. Note that firms can observe the
cost functions and misinformation of their own and rival firms. As mentioned before, we
assume from Section 3 through Section 5 that both quality standards for Type l and h are
binding, which means that firms do not freely choose the true qualities to maximize their
own profits.24 Thus, in the first stage, each firm chooses the amount of misinformation
on its own product, ek (k = l, h), unless the government regulation on misinformation is
binding. In the second stage, given the true quality of and the amount of misinformation
(the degree of misperception) on both products, both firms compete in the market in
price. The notion of equilibrium is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.25
2.3 Government and Social Welfare
Quality standards exist for both types of products. The standard for a low-quality prod-
uct is an MQS, and that for a high-quality product is a certification criterion conveyed
to its consumers through labeling. In Stage 0, the government sets regulations on mis-
information, an MQS, and a certification criterion; the policies are exogenous variables
23Even in reality, it is difficult to verify the relationship between the cost of creating misperception and
true quality (or the production amount), because there are no general correlations between them.
24If both firms are symmetric, and firms can choose true qualities, it is possible that more than one
equilibrium exist. However, we do not investigate the problem of multiple equilibria in detail. In the main
analysis, those qualities are fixed. Moreover, even in Section 6 in which we consider quality investment,
either one firm produces a low-quality product because firms compete in price, and the MQS is binding
for the low-quality product. Therefore, the possibility that multiple equilibria exist does not affect our
results.
25The setting of the order of choices, which is “misinformation first, and price/quantity second,” is
the same as in Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010). In reality, although firms may set list prices and send
misinformation simultaneously, they often change their prices, i.e., they discount list prices after shipping.
Prices in our model are not the list prices but the prices that consumers actually pay when they purchase
the products. Therefore, our setting of the stages is consistent with competition among firms in the real
world.
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in this model. This means that we do not delve into the government’s optimal policies
and/or strategic behavior; rather, we conduct comparative statics to examine the effects
of regulations and the MQS on firms’ behavior and welfare.
Consumers misperceive product quality because of the misinformation sent by firms,
and maximize their utility based on perceived qualities, while the true surplus depends
on true qualities. There are three types of consumers: (a) those who purchase the low-
quality product, (b) those who purchase the high-quality product, and (c) those who buy
nothing. Therefore, the aggregate consumer surplus can be represented as follows:
CS = CSl + CSh =
∫ θ˜
0
(v − θsl − pl) dθ +
∫ θˆ
θ˜
(v − θsh − ph) dθ,
where CSl and CSh denote the consumer surplus generated by the consumption of the
low- and high- quality product, respectively. Note that misinformation (ek (k = l, h)) is
not directly included in the true surplus. Misinformation affects utility only through its
effects on the consumption amounts (θˆ, θ˜) and prices (pl, ph). Thus, welfare is given by
W = CS + pil + pih.
3 Misinformation and Welfare
In this section, focusing on the second stage, we examine the effct of a change in mis-
information on prices, outputs, and welfare. Given the degrees of misperception, the
equilibrium prices and quantities in the second stage are given as follows:
p∗l (el, eh; sl, sh) =
(sˆl − sˆh)v
4sˆl − sˆh , p
∗
h(el, eh; sl, sh) =
2(sˆl − sˆh)v
4sˆl − sˆh , (4)
q∗l (el, eh; sl, sh) =
v
4sˆl − sˆh , q
∗
h(el, eh; sl, sh) =
2sˆlv
4sˆl − sˆh . (5)
It follows from (4) and (5) that (a) the price of Type k (k = h, l) good is decreasing
(resp. increasing) in misinformation on Type l (resp. Type h), (b) the quantity of Type
k (k = h, l) good is increasing (resp. decreasing) in misinformation on Type l (resp.
Type h). Then, we obtain the effects of changes in the amount of misinformation on the
12
revenues of both firms, which are defined as Rk = p
∗
k(el, eh; sl, sh)q
∗
k(el, eh; sl, sh):
∂Rl
∂el
=
(4sˆl − 7sˆh)
(4sˆl − sˆh)3 · v
2,
∂Rl
∂eh
=
2sˆl + sˆh
(4sˆl − sˆh)3 · v
2 > 0, (6)
∂Rh
∂el
= −4(2sˆl + sˆh)v
2
(4sˆl − sˆh)3 < 0,
∂Rh
∂eh
=
4sˆl(4sˆ
2
l − 3sˆhsˆl + 2sˆ2h)
sˆ2h(4sˆl − sˆh)3
· v2 > 0. (7)
On the other hand, onsumer surplus is given as follows:
CS = CSl + CSh =
∫ v
4sˆl−sˆh
0
(v − θsl − p∗l ) dθ +
∫ (2sˆl+sˆh)v
sˆh(4sˆl−sˆh)
v
4sˆl−sˆh
(v − θsh − p∗h) dθ
=
6sˆl − sl
2(4sˆl − sˆh)2 · v
2 +
4sˆlsˆh(2sˆl + sˆh)− 4sh(sˆlsˆh + sˆ2l )
2sˆ2h(4sˆl − sˆh)2
· v2. (8)
From (8), the effects of changes in the amount of misinformation on consumer surplus are
obtained:
∂CSl
∂el
=
24sˆl + 6sˆh − 8sl
2(4sˆl − sˆh)3 · v
2,
∂CSh
∂el
=
2sˆh(8sˆl + sˆh)− 2sh(6sˆl + sˆh)
sˆh(4sˆl − sˆh)3 · v
2, (9)
∂CSl
∂eh
= − 6sˆl − sl
(4sˆl − sˆh)3 · v
2 < 0, (10)
∂CSh
∂eh
= −2shsˆl(8sˆ
2
l + 4sˆhsˆl + sˆ
2
h)− 4sˆhsˆl(4sˆ2l + sˆlsˆh + sˆ2h)
sˆ3h(4sˆl − sˆh)3
· v2 < 0. (11)
In particular, for the effect of misinformation on Type h good, we record the following
lemma.
Lemma 1
An increase in misinformation on Type h good always decreases consumer surplus.
This implies that misinformation about Type h good is always excessive for consumers.
Let us now examine the effect of a change in misinformation on welfare. First, assuming
that the amount of misinformation on Type h (eh) is fixed, we examine the welfare effect
of a change in the amount of misinformation on Type l (el). From (6), (7), and (9), it is
obtained that
∂(CS +Rl +Rh)
∂el
=
48sˆlsˆh − 12sˆ2h − 8slsˆh − 24sˆlsh − 4shsˆh
2sˆh(4sˆl − sˆh)3 (12)
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holds. If sk > 1.5sˆk (k = l, h) and, accordingly, if ek > sk/3 for both types of products,
(12) is negative. Moreover, it is costly for Firm l to increase the amount of misinformation.
Thus, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2
Suppose that the amount of misinformation on Type h (eh) is fixed. If the misinformation
amounts sent by both firms are greater than certain levels, i.e., if ek > sk/3 (k = l, h),
a small decrease in the misinformation on Type l good improves welfare.
The intuition is as follows. An increase in the misinformation on Type l good means that
the price competition between firms becomes more intense because the two types of goods
become more similar in the eyes of consumers. Thus, prices decrease and, accordingly,
welfare improves in this respect. On the other hand, some of consumers who would have
bought Type h good without an increase in the misinformation on Type l choose to
buy Type l good. And, some of consumers who would have bought nothing without an
increase in the misinformation on Type l choose to buy Type h good. Thus, when there
is misinformation, the more intense the competition is, the greater the damage resulting
from misperception is. When the amount of misinformation is significant, the increase in
the damage resulting from misperception dominates the increase in the benefit derived
from lower prices.
The possibility that a decrease in the amount of misinformation on Type l leads to lower
welfare is noteworthy. As discussed in the intuition above, as price competition becomes
more intense, a distortion of insufficient supply caused by an imperfectly competitive
market is mitigated. Therefore, a small increase in misinformation may contribute to an
improvement in welfare when the amount of misinformation is relatively small, and when
the difference between the perceived qualities is large (see (12)).
It is also interesting to focus on the difference between the true qualities. Because
sk > sˆk (k = l, h), if the difference between the true quality of both types of products,
sl and sh, is small, it is likely that (12) is negative. A stricter MQS implies a smaller sl,
as long as the MQS is binding and, therefore, a stricter MQS creates a smaller difference
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between the true qualities. Thus, it is clear that the strictness of the MQS influences the
welfare effect of a change in misinformation on Type l good; a stricter MQS implies that
it is more likely that a small decrease in misinformation on Type l good improves welfare.
Second, assuming that the amount of misinformation on Type l (el) is fixed, we examine
the welfare effect of a change in the amount of misinformation on Type h (eh). From (6),
(7), (10), and (11), the following is obtained:
∂(CS +Rl +Rh)
∂eh
= − sˆ
3
h(sl − sˆh) + 8sˆlsˆ2h(sˆl − sˆh) + 2sˆlsh(8sˆ2l + 4sˆlsˆh + sˆ2h)
sˆ3h(4sˆl − sˆh)3
· v2
< 0.
This inequality means that the effect on consumer surplus, which is negative, dominates
the effect on firm revenue, which is positive. Moreover, this inequality does not depend
on the differences between true qualities and the qualities perceived by consumers. Since
it is costly to increase misinformation, we record the following result.
Lemma 3
Suppose that the amount of misinformation on Type l (el) is fixed. Then, a small decrease
in the misinformation on Type h good always improves welfare.
In this case, the effect on consumer surplus is in sharp contrast with the effect on rev-
enues. A small increase in misinformation on Type h decreases intensity in competition.
Accordingly, the prices of both products and revenues of both firms increase. Consumers
then suffer not only from the price increases but also from greater damage from more
misinformation. Therefore, a small increase in eh necessarily decreases consumer surplus.
In total, however, the effect on the consumer surplus always dominates the effect on firm
revenues.
It follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 that misinformation on Type h is always socially
excessive, whereas it is possible that misinformation on Type l is insufficient. Then, we
obtain important policy implications related to our first purpose, which is to examine the
welfare effect of regulating misinformation in the presence of an MQS and a certification
criterion. Consider a situation where the government can directly regulate the amount
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of misinformation/misperception. For example, the government may be able to set a
maximum amount of misinformation so that it is binding.26 In this case, it is clear from
Lemma 2 that a more stringent regulation on misinformation about Type l good improves
welfare when the amount of misinformation is large. It can also be said from Lemma 3
that a stricter regulation on misinformation about Type h good always improves welfare.
Moreover, the MQS complements the regulation on misinformation about Type l good in
the sense that the stricter the MQS is, the more likely it is that a stricter regulation on
misinformation about Type l good improves welfare. Consequently, from Lemmas 2 and
3, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1
When the government can directly regulate the amount of misinformation/misperception,
it can improve welfare by setting regulations on misinformation. The stricter regulation
on misinformation about Type h good always improves welfare. On the other hand, the
effect of stricter regulation on misinformation about Type l good depends on the strictness
of the MQS. However, if ek > sk/3 (k = l, h), then this also improves welfare irrespective
of the strictness of the MQS.
4 Competition for “Misleading” Between Firms
4.1 Misinformation in Equilibrium
Taking into consideration the effect of a change in the amount of misinformation on prices
and quantities ((4) and (5)), each firm chooses the amount of misinformation on its own
product in the first stage. The profit functions in the first stage (Πk (k=l,h)) can be
rewritten as follows:
Πk = Rk − fk(ek)− Fk(sk), k = l, h.
The first-order condition (FOC) for each firm is denoted as follows:
∂Πk
∂ek
=
∂Rk
∂ek
− f ′k = 0. (13)
26We may recall that when consumers are naive, they know only sˆk (k = l, h) even under this type of
policy.
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We assume that the following second-order conditions (SOCs) hold.27
Assumption 1
∂2Rk
∂e2k
− f ′′k < 0, k = l, h,
∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Rl
∂e2l
− f ′′l ∂
2Rl
∂eh∂el
∂2Rh
∂el∂eh
∂2Rh
∂e2h
− f ′′h
∣∣∣∣∣ = Ω > 0.
In particular, when  > 3 (see Equation (2)), the SOCs always hold. See the Appendix
for further details.
Solving the reaction functions for both firms ((13) for each type), we can characterize
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game: eNk = e
N
k (sl, sh), and sˆ
N
k = sk −
eNk . Moreover, we define R
N
k = p
N
k q
N
k = p
∗
k(e
N
l , e
N
h , sl, sh)q
∗
k(e
N
l , e
N
h , sl, sh) and CS
N =
CSN(eNl , e
N
h , sl, sh) = CS
N
l (e
N
l , e
N
h , sl, sh) + CS
N
h (e
N
l , e
N
h , sl, sh).
We also assume that the following condition holds.
Assumption 2 4sˆNl > 7sˆ
N
h .
We recall from (6) that ∂Rl/∂el = (4sˆl− 7sˆh)v2/(4sˆ2l − sˆh)3. Thus, Assumption 2 implies
that ∂RNl /∂el > 0 holds. In other words, because f
′
k(0) = 0, firms always have incentives
to send misinformation so that consumers perceive that goods are healthier/safer than
they actually are. Misinformation on Type l good has precisely two effects. First, by
sending misinformation, Firm l can attract certain consumers who would have bought
Type h goods if there were no such misinformation. Second, the two kinds of products
may become more similar because of a small increase in the misinformation on Type l
good, which means that price competition becomes more intense. When the difference in
the perceived qualities is relatively large (i.e., 4sˆl > 7sˆh), the former effect dominates the
latter, and firms always have an incentive to send misinformation.28
27In detail, we have
∂2Rl
∂e2l
=
16(2sˆl − 5sˆh)
(4sˆl − sˆh)4 · v
2,
∂2Rh
∂e2h
=
8sˆl(16sˆ2l (sˆl − sˆh) + sˆ2h(6sˆl − 3sˆh))
sˆ3h(4sˆl − sˆh)4
· v2 > 0.
28When Assumption 2 does not hold, Firm l has an incentive to send misinformation so that consumers
perceive that goods are unhealthier/less safe than they actually are to avoid fiercer price competition.
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Moreover, strategic relationships should be noted. From (6), (7), the following is
obtained:
∂2Πl
∂eh∂el
=
∂2Rl
∂eh∂el
=
2(8sˆl + 7sˆh)
(4sˆl − sˆh)4 · v
2 > 0, (14)
∂2Πh
∂el∂eh
=
∂2Rh
∂el∂eh
=
4(8sˆ2l + sˆ
2
h + 12sˆhsˆl)
4(sˆl − sˆh)4 · v
2 > 0. (15)
Assuming that the SOCs are assumed to hold, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4
The amount of misinformation sent by Firm l and that sent by Firm h are strategic
complements.
This relationship holds because firms want to avoid intense price competition during the
second stage. This implies that the smaller the amount of misinformation on one type of
product, the less misinformation is sent by the firm producing the other type of product.
4.2 Government Intervention
In the previous section, we considered the effects of changes in the amount of misinfor-
mation (the degree of misperception) that can be applied when the government directly
controls misinformation. In reality, however, the government often indirectly reduces
misinformation/misperceptions by increasing the cost of creating misperceptions by (a)
sending counter-information, (b) educating consumers, and/or (c) taxing advertising. For
example, the FDA is responsible for advancing public health by helping the public receive
accurate, scientifically based information required when consuming medicines and food
that maintain and improve their health. The greater the counter-information/education
generated by the government, the more difficult it is for firms to persuade consumers to
misperceive the quality of their products. In other words, firms have to pay higher costs
to create a certain degree of misperception among consumers. In the case of taxation
on advertising, it is clear that an increase in the tax rate raises the cost of creating a
Although this situation is theoretically possible, it is different from real world issues we focus on. Thus,
we exclude the case of this type of “negative” misinformation from our analysis.
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certain degree of misinformation. It follows from the analysis in the previous section that
misinformation is likely to reduce welfare. Therefore, in such a case, the government has
an incentive to increase the firms’ costs for creating misperceptions to improve welfare.
In this subsection, we examine this type of government intervention. An increase in the
cost of creating a certain degree of misperception is captured by an increase in αk in (2).
First, suppose that αl = αk = α. We totally differentiate the FOCs for both firms
((13)) to obtain the following: ∂2RNl∂e2l − f ′′l ∂2RNl∂eh∂el
∂2RNh
∂el∂eh
∂2RNh
∂e2h
− f ′′h
( deNldα
deNh
dα
)
=
(
 · (eNl )−1
 · (eNh )−1
)
. (16)
We may recall that the SOCs are assumed to hold (see Appendix). In addition, e−1k > 0
when ek is positive. Thus, from Lemma 4 and (16), the following result is obtained.
Lemma 5
Suppose that αl = αk = α. Then, counter-information/education provided by the govern-
ment and/or taxation on advertising reduces the amount of misinformation about both
types of products.
Next, consider the situation in which αl 6= αk and the government increases either one
of two firms’ costs for creating misinformation. For example, the government may warn
consumers about the unhealthy attributes of “lower quality” (Type l), or may need to
undeceive consumers when they put too much confidence in the quality of Type h good.
Similar to (16), the former case can be analyzed by the total differentiation of the FOCs: ∂2RNl∂e2l − f ′′l ∂2RNl∂eh∂el
∂2RNh
∂el∂eh
∂2RNh
∂e2h
− f ′′h
( deNldαl
deNh
dαl
)
=
(
 · (eNl )−1
0
)
.
The latter case can be analyzed in a similar way. Consequently, the following result is
established.
Lemma 6
Suppose that αl 6= αk. When the government sends counter-information and/or educates
consumers on either type of product, misinformation amounts on both products decrease.
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Counter-information/education on Type k (k = l, h) directly reduces misinformation on
Type k. Moreover, since misinformation amounts are strategic complements (Lemma 4),
the firm that produces the other type of good responds to the decrease in misinformation
on Type k by decreasing the misinformation on its own product.
Thus, from the analysis in Section 3, this type of effort by the government is likely to
lead to a higher sum of revenues and consumer surplus. The increase can be observed
particularly with a large amount of misinformation.29 Consequently, from Lemmas 2, 3,
5, and 6, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2
The government can improve welfare by mitigating the competition of misleading between
firms, unless policy implementation costs are not very high. In particular, when the
amount of misinformation is large (eNk > sk/3 (k = l, h)), government intervention works
in favor of welfare.
5 Minimum Quality Standards
Our second purpose is to investigate the effect of a stricter MQS on welfare in the presence
of misinformation.30 The MQS directly affects the true quality of Type l good: a stricter
MQS implies a smaller sl. Since a change in sl affects the amounts of misinformation, the
total effect of a change in MQS on welfare is denoted as follows:
dWN
dsl
=
∂WN
∂sl
+
∂WN
∂el
deNl
dsl
+
∂WN
∂eh
deNh
dsl
.
The first term represents the direct effect, while the second and third terms represent
the indirect effects. Note that WN = CSN + piNl (e
N
l , e
N
h , sl, sh) + pi
N
h (e
N
l , e
N
h , sl, sh), where
piNk = R
N
k − f(eNk )− F (sk) (k = l, h).
29We do not consider explicitly the cost of implementing these policies. The result, however, essentially
does not change even if we take into consideration the implementation cost.
30We may recall that our purpose is to conduct comparative statics excluding the repeatedness of
consumption. Although we use the word “change,” it does not mean that consumers purchase goods
several times or change their behavior after the MQS becomes stricter.
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First, we examine the direct effect. Since sˆl = sl − el holds, from Assumption 2 and
(6) and (7), we obtain the following:
∂RNl
∂sl
= −∂R
N
l
∂el
=
(−4sˆNl + 7sˆNh )v2
(4sˆNl − sˆNh )3
< 0, (17)
∂RNh
∂sl
= −∂R
N
h
∂el
=
4(2sˆNl + sˆ
N
h )v
2
(4sˆNl − sˆNh )3
> 0. (18)
Although the effects of a change in the MQS on both firms’ revenues conflict with each
other, the effect on total revenue is as follows:
∂(RNl +R
N
h )
∂sl
=
(4sˆNl + 11sˆ
N
h )v
2
(4sˆNl − sˆNh )3
> 0. (19)
From (8), we derive the following:
∂CSNl
∂sl
=
v2
2
· 5(4sˆ
N
l − sˆNh )− 8(6sˆNl − sl)
(4sˆNl − sˆNh )3
, (20)
∂CSNh
∂sl
=
v2
2sˆNh
· 4sh(6sˆ
N
l + sˆ
N
h )− 4sˆNh (8sˆNl + sˆNh )
(4sˆNl − sˆNh )3
. (21)
From (19) through (21), the following is obtained:
∂CSN +RNl +R
N
h
∂sl
=
v2
2sˆNh
· 24shsˆ
N
l + 8sˆ
N
h sl − 52sˆNh sˆNl + 13sˆN2h + 4shsˆNh
(4sˆNl − sˆNh )3
.
Thus, if eNk > 5/13 · sk (k = l, h), then ∂(CSN + RNl + RNh )/∂sl > 0 always holds.
Consequently, because it is costly to decrease sl, we obtain the following lemma.
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Lemma 7
The greater the amount of misinformation, the more likely it is that the direct effect of
a stricter MQS (a small decrease in sl) works to reduce welfare, i.e., ∂W/∂sl > 0. In
particular, if eNk > 5sk/13 for k = l, h, then ∂W/∂sl > 0 always holds.
We can apply the intuition to Lemma 2 to understand Lemma 7. A decrease in sl means
that price competition between firms becomes more intense because the two types of
goods increase in similarity. Thus, the price decreases and, accordingly, welfare improves
in this respect. However, some of consumers who would have bought Type h good if there
31Note that this lemma also applies to the case in which the regulations on misinformation are binding.
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were no change in the MQS now choose to buy Type l good. The larger the amount
of misinformation about Type l good, the greater will be the damage resulting from
misperception when goods are purchased. Moreover, some of consumers who would have
bought nothing if there were no change in the MQS now choose to buy Type h product.
The larger the amount of misinformation on Type h good, the greater will be the damage
resulting from misperception by “new” consumers. When misinformation amounts are
large, the increase in the damage dominates the increase in the benefit derived from lower
prices.
Second, we examine the indirect effects from changes in the amount of misinformation
on both types of goods. From Lemmas 2 and 3, we have already obtained the results on
∂WN/∂ek (k = l, h). Therefore, we focus on the effect of a change in the MQS (sl) on
the amount of misinformation sent by both firms.
As noted in Section 3, each firm chooses the amount of misinformation in the first
stage to maximize its own profit given the quality standards. We totally differentiate the
FOCs ((13)) for both firms to obtain the following: ∂2RNl∂e2l − f ′′l ∂2RNl∂eh∂el
∂2RNh
∂el∂eh
∂2RNh
∂e2h
− f ′′h
( deNldsl
deNh
dsl
)
=
(
− ∂2RNl
∂sl∂el
− ∂2RNh
∂sl∂eh
)
.
From (14) and (15), and the facts that ∂2RNl /∂sl∂el = −∂2RNl /∂e2l and ∂2RNh /∂sl∂eh =
−∂2RNl /∂el∂eh, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 8
A stricter MQS (a smaller sl) always leads to a larger amount of misinformation on Type h
good. Moreover, if sˆNl > 5sˆ
N
h /2, a stricter MQS leads to a larger amount of misinformation
on Type l good.
A stricter MQS, given misinformation, makes the two types of products more similar in
terms of consumers’ perceptions. Thus, Firm h has an incentive to send a larger amount
of misinformation to differentiate more clearly its own product from Type l good, and
avoid intense price competition. On the other hand, two effects work in terms of Firm l’s
incentive, which conflict with each other. First, a small increase in el and a small decrease
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in sl have the same meaning in terms of consumer perception: the smaller is sl, the less
misinformation Firm l needs to send to create a certain level of perceived quality (sˆl).
Second, misinformation amounts sent by both firms are strategic complements. In this
respect, Firm l responds to an increase in eh by increasing its own misinformation. When
the difference between the perceived qualities of the two types of goods is large, the latter
effect dominates the former effect, i.e., facing a greater eh as a result of a stricter MQS,
Firm l can increase its profit by increasing its own misinformation.
Consequently, from Lemmas 2, 3, 7, and 8, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3
A stricter MQS can harm welfare because of the existence of misinformation. In particular,
(a) the larger misinformation amounts sent by firms and (b) the greater the difference
between the perceived qualities of the two types of goods, the more likely it is that a
stricter MQS reduces welfare.
From the definition of profits of firms ((3)), it is costly for Firm l to increase the
quality of its own product. A stricter MQS implies higher fixed costs, and welfare is
reduced in this respect, even in the absence of misinformation. However, in the present
case, misinformation may itself hinder the government from improving welfare by setting
a stricter MQS: this means that ∂(CN + RNl + R
N
h )/∂sl > 0 may hold in the presence of
misinformation.
To clarify the role of misinformation, we consider the case of no misinformation where
sˆk = sk (k = l, h) holds.
32 From the definition ((8)), we obtain the following consumer
surplus:
CSNM = CSNMl + CS
NM
h =
5slv
2
2(4sl − sh)2 +
4s2l v
2
2sh(4sl − sh)2 ,
where NM denotes the equilibrium in the case of no misinformation. The effect of a
change in the MQS on consumer surplus is as follows:
∂CSNM
∂sl
= −(28sl + 5sh)v
2
2(4sl − sh)3 < 0 (22)
32Complete prohibition of misinformation fits this situation.
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When the MQS becomes stricter, the qualities of the two types of products increase
in similarity, which leads to lower prices. In contrast with the case in the presence
of misinformation, there is no damage resulting from misperception. Thus, a stricter
MQS results in greater consumer surplus. In other words, a stricter MQS removes excess
differentiation.
Moreover, similar to (17) and (18), the effects of a change in the MQS on firm revenues
are given as follows:
∂RNMl
∂sl
=
(−4sl + 7sh)v2
(4sl − sh)3 < 0,
∂RNMh
∂sl
=
4(2sl + sh)v
2
(4sl − sh)3 > 0.
Thus, the effect on total revenue is as follows:
∂(RNMl +R
NM
h )
∂sl
=
(4sl + 11sh)v
2
(4sl − sh)3 > 0. (23)
A small increase in sl makes Type l good less healthy. Thus, certain consumers buy
Type h instead of Type l. Moreover, because the difference between the two types of
products increases, price competition becomes less intense. Therefore, the revenue of
Firm h increases. On the other hand, the change in consumers’ behavior decreases Firm
l’s revenue, whereas the price change increases it. In total, when Assumption 2 holds,
the former effect dominates the latter effect in terms of the revenue of Firm l. Thus, the
revenue of Firm l decreases.
In total, from (22) and (23), the effect on consumer surplus dominates the effect on
revenues: ∂(CN +RNl +R
N
h )/∂sl is always negative.
Proposition 4
Suppose that there is no misinformation. Then, unless there is a large increase in fixed
costs to make Type l product healthier/safer, the stricter the MQS, the greater will be
the welfare.
Since it is costly to improve the quality of Type l good (F ′l < 0), Firm l may not have
an incentive to improve the quality of its own product. However, a quality improvement
would increase consumer surplus. Thus, a stricter MQS may improve welfare. It can be
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emphasized that, in contrast with the case in the presence of misinformation, a change
in consumers’ purchasing behavior in response to a change in the MQS does not hinder
government intervention of raising welfare by making the MQS stricter.
6 Extension: Investment in Quality by the Producer
of the High-quality Product
To this point, we have assumed that both the MQS and the certification criterion are
binding, by which we extracted clearly the relationship between quality standards and
misinformation. However, it may be possible, particularly in the long run, that firms pro-
ducing high-quality products choose not only a certain amount of misleading advertising
but also the quality of their own products. In this section, we extend our analysis to the
case where the certification criterion is not binding. As in the previous sections, the MQS
is assumed to be binding.
First, we examine the partial effect of a change in sh given the MQS and the amount
of misinformation. Because sˆh = sh − eh holds, we obtain the following:
∂Rl
∂sh
= −∂Rl
∂eh
= − 2sˆl + sˆh
(4sˆl − sˆh)3 · v
2 < 0, (24)
∂Rh
∂sh
= −∂Rh
∂eh
= −4sˆl(4sˆ
2
l − 3sˆhsˆl + 2sˆ2h)
sˆ2h(4sˆl − sˆh)3
· v2 < 0. (25)
On the other hand, we obtain the following from (8):
∂CSl
∂sh
=
6sˆl − sl
(4sˆl − sˆh)3 · v
2 > 0, (26)
∂CSh
∂sh
=
2(−12sˆ3l sˆh + 3sˆ2l sˆ2h + 3sˆlsˆ3h + 8sˆ3l sh − 3sˆlsˆ2hsh)
sˆ3h(4sˆl − sˆh)3
· v2 < 0. (27)
From (24) through (27), ∂(CS + Rl + Rh)/∂sh < 0 holds. Thus, we have the following
result.
Lemma 9
Given the MQS and the misinformation amounts on both types of products, a small
improvement in the quality of the high-quality product increases the sum of consumer
surplus and firms’ revenues.
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Next, we consider the choice of true quality by Firm h in response to a change in
the amount of misinformation. Different from the structure of the game in the previous
sections, we assume that the amount of misinformation and MQS are determined in Stage
0, and accordingly, they are binding for firms. Then, Firm h chooses quality in the first
stage. The FOC for Firm h is given by ∂Rh/∂sh − F ′h = 0. It is also assumed that the
SOC holds: ∂2Rh/∂s
2
h − F ′′h < 0.
First, consider a small decrease in eh, which can be applied to the case where the
government sets a stricter regulation on misinformation of Type h good. As noted
above, sˆh = sh − eh holds. Thus, on the analogy of ∂2Rh/∂e2h > 0 (See footnote 28),
∂2Rh/∂eh∂sh < 0 holds. This implies that the marginal benefit of improving quality for
Firm h becomes greater as the amount of misinformation on its own product becomes
larger. Thus, dsNTh /deh < 0 holds, where NT denotes the equilibrium in the case where
Firm h chooses true quality. Second, consider a small decrease in el. It follows from
(15) that ∂2Rh/∂el∂sh = −∂2Rh/∂el∂eh < 0. This implies that the marginal benefit of
improving quality for Firm h becomes greater as the amount of misinformation on the
rival product increases. Thus, dsNTh /del < 0 holds. Consequently, the following result is
obtained.
Lemma 10
Suppose that both the regulations on misinformation on both types of products and MQS
are binding. Then, a small decrease in ek (k = l, h), which means stricter regulation on
misinformation of Type k goods, deteriorates the true quality of the high-quality product.
When the MQS and regulations on misinformation for both types of products are binding,
a small decrease in el may improve welfare (Lemma 2), while a small decrease in eh always
improves welfare (Lemma 3). However, these changes indirectly reduce welfare through
a change in the true quality of the high-quality product (Lemmas 9 and 10). Thus, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5
Suppose that both the regulations on misinformation on both types of products and the
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MQS are binding. Then, the welfare-improving effect of a small decrease in ek (k = l, h)
is weakened by deterioration of the true quality of the high-quality product.
In particular, the result on the effect of a change in eh is in sharp contrast to Lemma
3. Whether a decrease in eh harms welfare depends on the degree of the change in sh in
response to the decrease in eh, which depends on the shapes of the cost function, F (·).
Now, let us turn to a situation in which Firm h chooses the amount of misinformation
and true quality simultaneously in the first stage, given el and sl.
33 We set the following
assumption for simplicity.
Assumption 3 Firm h chooses both the true quality (sh) and amount of misinformation
(eh) in the first stage, when neither is binding.
Then, the FOCs are ∂Rh/∂eh − f ′h = 0 and ∂Rh/∂sh − F ′h = 0. From the definition of
perceived utility ((1)), it is clear that the true quality and amount of misinformation are
symmetric for Firm h. In other words, perceived quality matters for a firm’s profit. Thus,
Firm h chooses both the true quality and the misinformation so that
∂Rh/∂eh = −∂Rh/∂sh = f ′h = −F ′h (28)
holds, when neither of them is binding. We assume that the following SOCs are satisfied.
Assumption 4
∂2pih
∂s2h
< 0,
∂2pih
∂e2h
< 0, and
∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Rh
∂e2h
− f ′′h ∂
2Rh
∂sh∂eh
∂2Rh
∂eh∂sh
∂2Rh
∂s2h
− F ′′h
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0
Assume that the regulation on the misinformation of the low-quality product is binding
and consider a small decrease in el. Note that since sˆl matters for Firm h in choosing
eh and sh, a small increase in sl, which means a laxer MQS, also gives rise to the same
result.
33Strictly speaking, a situation in which el, eh, and sh are determined simultaneously should be de-
scribed. However, we describe the situation in which el and sl are exogenous to make the presentation as
simple as possible. We will briefly discuss the case in which three variables are determined simultaneously.
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We totally differentiate the FOCs for Firm h to obtain: ∂2RNTh∂e2h − f ′′h ∂2RNTh∂sh∂eh
∂2RNTh
∂eh∂sh
∂2RNTh
∂s2h
− F ′′h
( deNThdel
dsNTh
del
)
=
(
−∂2RNTh
∂eh∂el
−∂2RNTh
∂sh∂el
)
. (29)
Recalling that ∂2Rh/∂eh∂sh < 0 (footnote 28), and that ∂
2Rh/∂eh∂el = −∂2Rh/∂sh∂el >
0 ((15)), we obtain that deNTh /del > 0 and ds
NT
h /del < 0.
Lemma 11
Suppose that both the regulation on misinformation on the low-quality product and the
MQS are binding. Then, a small decrease in el (resp. a small increase in sl), which means
a stricter regulation on misinformation of the low-quality product (resp. a laxer MQS),
deteriorates the true quality of the high-quality product.
Consequently, from Lemmas 2, 9 and 11, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6
Suppose that both the regulation on misinformation on the low-quality product and the
MQS are binding. Then, the improvement in welfare via a stricter regulation on misinfor-
mation on the low-quality product may be weakened because of deterioration of the true
quality of the high-quality product.
We recall that misinformation amounts are strategic complements in the first stage (Lemma
4). Since a decrease in el or an increase in sl implies that the perceived quality of Type
l good decreases (an increase in sˆl), Firm h responds to this change in the regulation or
standard by lowering the perceived quality of its own product. Thus, Firm h not only
decreases the misinformation but also deteriorates the true quality.
When focusing on the effect of a stricter MQS, it follows from Lemma 11 that misin-
formation on Type h good increases and the true quality of the good improves. In terms
of the effect on welfare, two effects can be considered to occur. First, compared with
the case in the absence of the choice over true quality, it is likely that the increase in
misinformation on Type h product in response to a change in the MQS is smaller. This is
because some of the outlay on advertising is substituted by a quality investment. Then,
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the improvement in the true quality of Type h product mitigates the undesirable effect of
an increase in misinformation.
Second, it is easier for Firm h to differentiate its own product from the rival’s low-
quality product when it can choose not only the amount of misinformation but also the
level of the true quality than when it can choose only the amount of misinformation.
Therefore, the decreases in prices because of intense competition also become smaller. In
this respect, an improvement in the true quality of Type h may damage the desirable
effect that mitigates insufficient supply.
Even when Firm l can choose the amount of misinformation, which means that the
regulation on misinformation of Type l is not binding, similar results are obtained on the
effect of a stricter MQS, as far as a stricter MQS leads to a smaller sˆl. In particular, from
Lemma 8, they hold when the difference between the perceived quality of the two types
of products is large.
In total, the effect of an improvement in true quality and that of an increase in misin-
formation conflict with each other in terms of welfare, while they have the same effect on
firm profits. Therefore, the additional means for Firm h, which is the choice of true qual-
ity, can work against welfare when considering the effect of regulations on misinformation
and quality standards. It should be emphasized that this undesirable effect in relation to
the MQS is specific to the situations in which misinformation exists.
7 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the relationship between misinformation/misperceptions and MQSs
when products are vertically differentiated in their health/safety aspects. In particular,
we investigated the welfare effect of regulating misinformation in the presence of an MQS
and a certification criterion. We also examined the welfare effect of a change in an MQS
(a stricter MQS) in the presence of misinformation.
The important results are as follows. First, when both the MQS and the certification
criterion are binding, a small decrease in misinformation on the low-quality product leads
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to greater welfare if the amount of misinformation on both low- and high-quality products
is large, while a small decrease in misinformation on the high-quality product always leads
to greater welfare. In determining whether or not regulation improves welfare, two con-
flicting factors play key roles: the distortion of insufficient supply because of imperfect
competition, and the difference between true and perceived qualities. We also demon-
strated that the government’s intervention to increase the cost of creating misperception,
such as sending counter-information, educating consumers, and/or taxing advertising, can
improve welfare.
Second, when the certification criterion is binding, a stricter MQS can harm welfare
because of the presence of misinformation. In particular, when the amount of misinfor-
mation is large, the direct effect of a stricter MQS (a small decrease in sl) works against
welfare. This is because a stricter MQS intensifies price competition and, accordingly,
increases total consumption. Then, the disutility from purchasing a product according to
misperception of the product’s quality is large. Moreover, when the difference between
the perceived qualities of the two types of products is large, a stricter MQS is likely to
increase the amount of misinformation on both products. Thus, when these two precon-
ditions are satisfied, a stricter MQS reduces welfare. This relationship between a stricter
MQS and welfare cannot be observed in the absence of misinformation.
Third, we extended the analysis to the case in which Firm h can choose both the true
quality and the amount of misinformation in the first stage. We demonstrate that the
possibility of changes in the true quality of the high-quality product may weaken the
positive effects of regulations and standards on welfare.
The results obtained in this paper clarify the relationship between misleading advertis-
ing and quality standards which is very important when consumers misperceive product
qualities. In the presence of misinformation, stricter quality standards can work against
welfare even if we exclude the increase in fixed costs of quality investment.
Although our results are clear and suggestive in terms of policies on quality standards
and advertising regulations, we did not deal with the following interesting points. First,
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the effect of a change in certification criteria for the high-quality product was not exam-
ined, although the effect and credibility of certification criteria occasionally draw attention
in reality, particularly when many types of criteria coexist. Second, we did not consider
the optimal policies, and it is also important to investigate whether equilibrium amounts
of misinformation are excessive or insufficient. The investigation of these points is for
future research.
Appendix: The Second-order Conditions for Assump-
tion 1
First, we prove that the second-order conditions are satisfied. In such a case, it must be
the case that
∂2pil
∂e2l
=
16v2(2sˆl − 5sˆh)
(4sˆl − sˆh)4 − f
′′
l < 0, and (30)
∂2pih
∂e2h
=
8v2sˆl(16sˆ
2
l (sˆl − sˆh) + sˆ2h(6sˆl − 3sˆh))
sˆ3h(4sˆl − sˆh)4
− f ′′h < 0. (31)
Using Euler’s theorem (ekf
′′
k = (− 1)f ′k), (30) can be rewritten as:
∂2pil
∂e2l
=
16v2(2sˆl − 5sˆh)
(4sˆl − sˆh)4 −
− 1
el
(4sˆl − 7sˆh)v2
(4sˆl − sˆh)3
=
v2(16el(2sˆl − 5sˆh)− (− 1)(4sˆl − 7sˆh)(4sˆl − sˆh))
el(4sˆl − sˆh)4
Because sˆl > el, it is verified that if  > 3, ∂
2pil/∂e
2
l < 0. In a similar way, (31) can be
rewritten as:
∂2pih
∂e2h
=
8v2sˆl(16sˆ
2
l (sˆl − sˆh) + sˆ2h(6sˆl − 3sˆh))
sˆ3h(4sˆl − sˆh)4
− − 1
eh
4sˆl(4sˆ
2
l − 3sˆhsˆl + 2sˆ2h)v2
sˆ2h(4sˆ
2
l − sˆh)3
< 0
Because sˆh > eh, the inequality always holds.
Next, we check if Ω > 0. Using Euler’s theorem, we obtain:
∂2Ri
∂ei∂sˆi
· sˆi + ∂
2Ri
∂ei∂sˆj
· sˆj = −2f ′i , i, j = h, l, i 6= j.
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Then, Ω can be rewritten as:
Ω =
{
∂2Rl
∂el∂sˆh
· sˆh
sˆl
+
2f ′l
sˆl
− f ′′l
}{
∂2Rh
∂eh∂sˆl
· sˆl
sˆh
+
2f ′h
sˆh
− f ′′h
}
− ∂
2Rl
∂eh∂el
∂2Rh
∂eh∂el
Recall that
∂2Ri
∂ei∂sˆj
= − ∂
2Ri
∂ei∂ej
< 0, i, j = h, f, i 6= j.
Thus, if Γ = 2f ′i/sˆi − f ′′i < 0, Ω > 0 holds. It holds that
Γ = f ′i ·
{
2
sˆi
− − 1
el
}
.
Because sˆi > ei, the sufficient condition for Γ to be negative is  > 3. Note that even if
 ≤ 3, Γ < 0 may hold.
Finally, we check that both firms obtain positive profits excluding the investment cost
in true qualities in equilibrium. Using Euler’s theorem, we obtain that:
piNl + Fl = −
∂RNl
∂sˆNl
· sˆl − ∂R
N
h
∂sˆh
· sˆNh −
eNl

· ∂R
N
l
∂el
Under Assumption 1, ∂RNl /∂el = −∂RNl /∂sˆl > 0. Moreover, ∂RNh /∂eh = −∂RNh /∂sˆh > 0
holds. Therefore, if sˆNl > e
N
l , the profit of firm l is positive in equilibrium. Similarly,
piNh + Fh = −
∂RNl
∂sˆl
· sˆNl −
∂RNh
∂sˆNh
· sˆNh −
eNh

· ∂R
N
h
∂eh
.
Therefore, if sˆNh > e
N
h , the profit of firm h is positive in equilibrium. And, if  > 1,
sˆNk > e
N
k , k = l, h always holds.
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